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Demand: 
Many theories on nuclear weapons and deterrence were developed with the 
USSR in mind. Today, nuclear armed rogue states are the persistent threat. 
Traditional deterrence theory relies on an accurate understanding of an 
adversary’s cost-benefit calculus, but rogue regimes consistently do not 
behave as predicted. Instead of relying on a potentially outdated logic, the 
wealth of newly available documents from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is an 
opportunity to develop a candid understanding of how rogue regimes truly 
operate within the domain of deterrence theory. 
 
Objective:  
The objective of this research project is to re-evaluate traditional deterrence 
theory and practice in light of the threats posed from rogue regimes by 
examining new evidence on decision-making in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. This 
will provide comparative lessons for U.S. deterrence policy regarding new 
and existing rogue regimes seeking nuclear weapons. 
 
Approach:  
The research will culminate in a workshop held in the Middle East with 
former U.S. officials, former senior members of Iraq’s Revolutionary Guard 
Corps, and several members of Saddam Hussein’s inner circle. The 
workshop and follow-on report will center efforts on understanding Iraqi 
decision-making regarding WMD, and American and Iraqi perceptions of 
each other’s military intentions and capabilities throughout the Saddam era. 
From this, lessons for future U.S. policy toward rogue regimes can be 
ascertained. 
